

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

10 August 1982

National Intelligence Council


MEMORANDUM FOR: Harold Ford
NIO at Large

FROM: MG Edward B. Atkeson, USA
National Intelligence Officer for
General Purpose Forces

SUBJECT: DCI Request for "Lessons Learned" Study

1. As I mentioned to you, I remain uncomfortable about the response we gave the DCI on the above subject at his meeting with the NIO's on 23 July 1982. The points I made at that time were:

- Professional quality military "lessons learned" studies of the Falklands/Lebanon/Iraq-Iran conflicts would involve extensive data accumulation and application of operations research techniques, plus considerable time and manhours of effort.



25X1

- As far as I know, there is no operations research entity within the Intelligence Community with an adequate capability for undertaking the analyses required to make respectable judgments regarding the combat actions or weapons systems performance. The IC is strong in the social and physical sciences. It is rather shorter on OR/SA skills.

2. My discomfort stems in part from a hunch that the DCI is not very well plugged in with the DIA effort. I suspect that connections exist at lower levels between analysts in CIA and

SECRET

25X1


DIA, but they are probably more ad hoc and informal than the importance of the work would indicate. The DCI carries primary responsibility for coordination of intelligence gathering activities, and yet there is little visible effort being mounted in his name. He has expressed an interest in the matter but we have replied in rather negative terms. ~~I think we owe him something more.~~

3. My other concern is that we may not have adequately explained to the DCI the scope of the military "lessons learned" development process and elicited from him any further guidance he may wish to give. Perhaps he would like us to look at political lessons, or economic issues. These, I would think, might be undertaken by the NIC without undue strain. The military side, however, will take considerably more time, principally to acquire the relevant details.

4. It seems to me that there should be someone appointed to act for the DCI in coordinating CIA and DIA efforts in this area. There are bound to be DDI and DDO interests which will duplicate those of DIA and other agencies and the services in DoD. Someone should determine who needs to know what and what he needs it for. It is a big project and not one likely to lend itself to "in addition to other duties" tasking.

5. I recommend that Harry, or someone of his choosing, discuss the matter with other CIA deputies and interested NFIB principals to work out some options for the DCI. The time is already late for this to be done in an orderly way. DIA may have already made up its travel plans. Even if the Middle East research is too far gone to influence, we may want to work up a corresponding investigation of the Falklands affair.

6. The upshot of the matter, I believe, is that the DCI may not be receiving the support for which he has asked and for which he carries responsibility. While I do not seek the responsibility myself and am plenty busy with other matters, I would be happy to be of whatever service I can in this regard.



Edward B. Atkeson